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ABSTRACT
Emerging market economies are fertile ground for the development of real estate and other financial
bubbles. Despite these economies' significant growth potential, their corporate and government
sectors do not generate the financial instruments to provide residents with adequate stores of value.
Capital often flows out of these economies seeking these stores of value in the developed world.
Bubbles are beneficial because they provide domestic stores of value and thereby reduce capital
outflows while increasing investment. But they come at a cost, as they expose the country to bubble-
crashes and capital flow reversals. We show that domestic financial underdevelopment not only
facilitates the emergence of bubbles, but also leads agents to undervalue the aggregate risk embodied
in financial bubbles. In this context, even rational bubbles can be welfare reducing. We study a set
of  aggregate  risk  management  policies  to  alleviate  the  bubble-risk.  We  show  that  liquidity
requirements, sterilization of capital inflows and structural policies aimed at developing public debt
markets "collateralized" by future revenues, all have a high payoff in this environment.
Ricardo J. Caballero











Emerging market economies (EM’s) are plagued by episodes of bubble-like dynamics.
These episodes begin with a “bubble” phase where credit, investment, asset prices,
and capital inﬂows, all grow, and end with a bust phase when these variables collapse.
Examples of these episodes include Argentina in the 1990’s, South East Asia in the
mid 1990’s, Mexico in the early 1990’s, Chile, Mexico and other Latin American
economies in the early 1980’s.
Academic theories of bubbles focus on two elements: the role of information in
coordinating agents’ actions to grow and ultimately prick bubbles; and, the role of the
macroeconomic environment in facilitating bubbles. We present a model that draws
on the second element.
We ﬁrst argue that an aggregate shortage of stores of value — which is the key
element for bubble formation highlighted in the macroeconomics literature (i.e. dy-
namic ineﬃciency) — is prevalent in emerging markets. Poor investor protection,
means that the corporate sector is unable to capitalize future earnings and provide
stores of value to the economy. Fiscal and sovereign-default concerns also limit the
ability of the government to issue reliable debt. These factors contribute to the “ﬁ-
nancial repression” that, for example, McKinnon (1973) has argued to be a prominent
aspect of EM’s ﬁnancial systems. The limited investment outlets, such as poor bank-
ing systems and conglomerates with severe corporate governance problems, receive
investment ﬂows despite their deﬁciencies. Real estate investment, which is one of
the best protected investment vehicles in EM’s, serves as prominent store of value as
well. Finally, where possible, agents actively seek high quality stores of value abroad
by purchasing developed economies’ safe assets.1
In this context, EM’s present a fertile macroeconomic environment for the emer-
gence of bubbles. Starting from this premise, we develop a simple overlapping gener-
ations (OLG) model of stochastic bubbles. In the model, the absence of an adequate
quantity of high-quality domestic ﬁnancial instruments to store value induces domes-
tic agents to seek this ﬁnancial service abroad through systematic capital outﬂows.
These outﬂows are costly for EM’s because they divert resources that may otherwise
be spent growing the domestic economy; foreign interest rates are low relative to
1In this light, the surge in demand for U.S. assets since the late 1990s, is a symptom of the
shortage of high-quality stores of value in EM’s following the crash in local bubbles during that
period.
2these economies’ growth potential and marginal product of capital. For reasons akin
to those found in the closed economy literature on dynamic ineﬃciency, the gap be-
tween low external returns and high domestic growth rates creates a space for rational
bubbles on unproductive local assets to arise. For concreteness, we refer to these as
Real Estate Bubbles. They are a response to agents’ demand for more proﬁtable store
of value instruments.
In the classical OLG model, the emergence of these rational bubbles is unambigu-
ously good as they complete a missing “intergenerational” market (see, Samuelson
1958 and Tirole 1985). This is the case, at least in an ex-ante sense, even if these
bubbles can crash as in Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Weil (1987). In contrast,
in the emerging markets setup we describe, the presence of fragility in bubbles can
render them socially undesirable, despite their service as a store of value.
We modify the standard OLG model in two ways to address the emerging markets
issues that we are interested in, and to arrive at our results. First, we introduce an
investment, rather than consumption, related demand for a store of value. Each gen-
eration of agents has an entrepreneurial and a banking sector. Investment projects
arise in the entrepreneurial sector, when agents are old. Young agents demand some
liquidity in order to fund these future investment projects. Second, and more impor-
tantly, we follow Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) by modelling constraints in the
domestic and international capital market. At the margin, domestic entrepreneurs
need to import international goods in order to undertake investment projects. How-
ever, the domestic capital market is segmented from the international capital market,
and international investors do not lend to domestic agents against their investment
projects. To facilitate trade with international investors, we endow each generation
of domestic agents with a limited amount of international goods/collateral. The in-
ternational endowment places a ceiling on how many goods the country can import
for investment projects. We assume that only the domestic banking sector has the
capability to lend to the entrepreneurial sector.
The international goods endowment of the generations grows at a high rate, cap-
turing the idea that an EM grows fast and will be able to import more goods in the
future. The high growth rate of this endowment creates some space for the develop-
ment of a bubble. As in the standard analysis of OLG models, welfare may improve if
the old sell a bubble asset to the next generation, collecting their international goods
endowment in exchange, and so on. We study an economy with a stochastic bubble
that provides the required liquidity to young agents, but may burst at any date.
3Our main result can be understood by considering the liquidity demand of young
bankers. These agents purchase a portfolio of the bubble asset and international
liquidity (i.e. foreign bank account) in order to be in a position to lend to the en-
trepreneurial sector, when old. However, if the entrepreneurial sector cannot commit
to repay all loans, in general the banker receives a return that is lower than the
marginal product of entrepreneurial investment. In particular, if the bubble crashes
both bankers and entrepreneurs are unable to sell their real estate holdings for the
international endowment of the next generation. In this event, the investment in the
entrepreneurial sector is constrained by the ex-ante portfolio share of international
liquidity chosen by bankers and entrepreneurs. However, since the banker does not
share fully in the return of entrepreneurial investment, the banker has a lower incen-
tive to store the international goods that are required, at the margin, to ﬁnance all
entrepreneurial investment projects in the crash, and more of an incentive to chase
the higher return promised by the bubble. We show that welfare is often improved
by reducing investment in the bubble.
During the growth phase of the bubble, the economy sustains high levels of invest-
ment. Entrepreneurs and bankers are able to sell their bubble asset for international
liquidity with which they ﬁnance investment projects. Capital inﬂows during this
period are high as agents are actively borrowing against the international collateral
of the country. Domestic credit grows as bankers are ﬂush with resources to lend
to the entrepreneurial sector. When the bubble crashes, entrepreneurs and bankers
are unable to trade for the international liquidity of other agents. Capital ﬂows re-
verse, domestic credit and investment falls.2 Thus, our model successfully reproduces
bubble dynamics in emerging economies.
An important policy discussion in emerging markets (and developed ones) con-
cerns managing the risks created by a bubble. In our model, rational bubbles arise
endogenously as a result of the economy’s dynamic ineﬃciency but can be welfare
reducing, because the private sector underestimates the costs of fragility.
There are two types of policies that can improve upon this outcome. The ﬁrst are
short-term risk-management policies that aim at discouraging excessive reallocation
of liquidity and savings toward local real estate. Banking regulations such as inter-
2This is in stark contrast with the canonical OLG model, in which bubbles crowd out private
investment, so that the bubble and private investment are negatively correlated. See Caballero,
Farhi and Hammour (2004) and Ventura (2004) for models that also exhibit positively correlated
bubbles and investment.
4national liquidity requirements reduce bubbles. These policies are similar to those
discussed in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) in the context of overborrowing and
the dollarization of liabilities problems. A more novel liquidity policy in our model is
sterilization of capital ﬂows. We show that if the government has suﬃcientcapacity to
tax current endowments, then by issuing one-period government debt and using the
proceeds to directly invest in international liquidity, the government can insure the
private sector against the fragility of the bubble. In the crash, the government injects
its international liquidity to oﬀset the insuﬃcient liquidity of the private sector.
The second type of policies are more directly linked to the source of bubbles in
these economies. They are aimed at improving the supply of domestic ﬁnancial assets
whose prices are not governed by bubble dynamics. We show that if a government
has suﬃcient credibility and commitment to securitize future taxes, then it can issue
enough public debt (a sort of collateralized Diamond, 1965, debt) to crowd out the
bubble while solving the dynamic ineﬃciency problem.3
The paper is related to several strands of literature. It builds on the work on
rational bubbles in general equilibrium, and in particular on Tirole (1985) and on
the segmented markets version in Ventura (2004). However, unlike the conclusion of
these papers and that of much of the literature, bubbles may be socially ineﬃcient in
our model. This insight informs most of our discussion.
Saint-Paul (1992) also develops a model where rational bubbles may be socially
ineﬃcient. However his context is entirely diﬀerent from ours, as in his case the
ineﬃciencyarises from bubbles crowding out physical capital in an endogenous growth
model with positivecapital spillovers. More closelyrelatedto our paper interms of the
focus on fragility, is that of Caballero, Farhi and Hammour (2004) where bubbles may
increase the chance of a crash in a multiple equilibria economy. In their context too,
the reason why this is potentially ineﬃcient is an externality in capital accumulation.
Instead, in our model the welfare implications stem from the riskiness of the bubble
itself and from the private sector’s distorted perception of the aggregate risk of their
choices.
In the literature on liquidity provision, Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) note that
ﬁnancial constraints lead to too little stores of value. In this context, they show that
government debt can improve on the allocation of the private sector. Hellwig and
3Of course, this solution may be fragile in itself, as expectations over the government’s ability to
pledge future taxes may be variable. But this is uncertainty of a very diﬀerent nature, unless it in
itself can feedback into the governments ability or commitment to deliver on each of these fronts.
5Lorenzoni (2004) study an economy where agents have limited commitment in repay-
ing debt contracts. They show that in economies which are dynamically ineﬃcient,
long term debt can be sustained even under this limited commitment constraint.
In terms of the source of the pecuniary externality and private undervaluation of
international liquidity, the mechanism is similar to that in Caballero and Krishna-
murthy (2001, 2003). However, the focus on these papers is on the externality and
not on the possibility of bubbles, their eﬃciency properties, and solutions to manage
bubbles. Moreover, in the current paper the main problem is not one of insuﬃcient
country-wide international liquidity during crises but one of signiﬁcant capital out-
ﬂows due to a coordination failure.
Finally, our emphasis on preventive policies to manage bubble-risk rather than ex-
post interventions contrasts with the views expressed by, e.g., Dornbusch (1999) and
Bernanke (2002) for developed economies, where ex-ante and ex-post interventions
take a more balanced role. The main reason for our emphasis on ex-ante policies is
that while developed economy policymakers can count on access to resources during
a bubble-crash, EM’s governments and central banks often ﬁnd themselves entangled
in the crisis itself.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describesthe structure of the economy,
while Section 3 introduces bubbles. Section 4 establishes the excessive volatilityof the
market outcome with bubbles. Section 5 and 6 discuss aggregate risk management
and ﬁnancial market development policies, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Productive Dynamically Ineﬃcient Emerging
Economy
The emerging economy is populated by an OLG of risk-neutral domestic agents that
produce and consume only when old. There are two types of goods, international and
domestic goods. The domestic goods are perishable, but the international goods can
be saved abroad at the world interest rate of r∗. Domestic goods and international
goods are perfect substitutes in the domestic consumers’ preferences. While for inter-
national investors, only the international goods are tradeable and oﬀer consumption
value. These assumptions eﬀectively limit foreign investors’ participation in domestic
markets.
Each agent is endowed with some date t goods and some date t+1 goods. Agents
6are born at date t with an endowment of Wt international goods. When old, agents
receive an endowment of RKt domestic goods (R>1). We can think of the latter
endowment as the returns from a domestic plant of size Kt that the agent is born
with. Thus, endowments at (t,t + 1) for an agent born at time t are (Wt,RK t).
At date t + 1, one-half of the agents of generation t become entrepreneurs, and
one-half become bankers. The entrepreneursreceivean investmentopportunity, which
produces RIt+1 units of domestic goods for an investment of It+1 units of international
goods. This production occurs instantaneously. The bankers do not receive any
direct investment opportunities, but may be in a position to lend to the investing
entrepreneurs (see below). We note that agents are ex-ante identical, while ex-post
there is heterogeneity.
We are centrally interested in how the young agent saves his international goods
to ﬁnance investment (directly or indirectly) when old. For this section, we assume
that the young agent saves all of his international goods abroad at the world interest
rate of r∗.L e tW  
t denote the international goods available at t +1t oam e m b e ro f





At each date there is a domestic ﬁnancial market, where entrepreneurs with in-
vestment opportunities borrow from bankers. The ﬁnancial market is instantaneous
in the same sense as production is instantaneous. At date t+1, an entrepreneur with
an investment opportunity borrows lt+1 international goods from a banker, oﬀering to
repay pt+1lt+1 domestic goods when production is complete. We impose a collateral
constraint on this loan:
pt+1lt+1 ≤ ψRKt
where ψ parameterizes the tightness of the collateral constraint.4
4The collateral constraint we have imposed requires that loans be collateralized by ψRKt.A n y
output from the new investment of It+1 is not considered collateral. This latter assumption is
diﬀerent than the standard credit constraints model, which would require that
pt+1lt+1 ≤ ψR(Kt + It+1)
where again ψ<1 parameterizes the tightness of the collateral constraint. Assuming that the









Kt + W  
t
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where the ﬁrst term is the familiar “equity” multiplier that arises in models of credit-constraints.
7Our model assumes that the domestic capital market is segmented. Neither for-
eign investors nor the young of generation t+1 participate in the loan market. Within
the logic of the model, this occurs because loans are repaid in perishable domestic
goods, which have no consumption value to either generation t +1o rf o r e i g ni n -
vestors. More generally, we think that foreign investors have limited participation in
local debt markets because of lack of local knowledge, and fear of sovereign expro-
priation/selective default. The latter concern is studied extensively in the sovereign
debt literature (e.g. Bulow and Rogoﬀ, 1989) which motivates a country-level debt
limit. Likewise, we think of the bankers of generation t as having more experience
dealing with the entrepreneurs of generation t.
Equilibrium in the loan market requires that,
1 ≤ pt+1 ≤ R,
since at a price below one, lenders will not lend, and at a price above R borrowers
will not borrow.
The supply of loans is W  
t/2 and the constrained demand for loans is
ψRKt
2pt+1 .W e
assume throughout that ψR < 1 and we normalize quantities and set Kt = Wt.
Utilizing these conditions, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium:
pt+1 =1 ,
so that bankers, in equilibrium, have international goods that are not lent to the
entrepreneurs.
On average, emerging market economies grow fast. We capture this feature by
assuming that the endowments (Wt,RK t) grows at a rate g such that:
g>r
∗.








As the domestic capital market is segmented, the aggregate supply of loans comes from the resources
of bankers. In total, the loan supply is W 
t/2 and the aggregate demand for loans is lt+1/2. Thus,
pt+1 =m a x [ 1 ,ψR(2 + Kt/W
 
t)] = max[1,3ψR]
which is very similar to the expression we derive under our assumption. Our assumption simpliﬁes
some of the algebra later in the paper without distracting from the substance of the results.
8Thus, our basic economy behaves as a dynamically ineﬃcient economy, in the sense
that store of value (rather than the marginal product of capital) has a lower return
than the rate of growth of the endowment. In this context, dynamic ineﬃciency
means that the country is lending (or leaving) too many international goods abroad.5
At each time t there is a capital outﬂow of Wt and an inﬂow of (1 + r∗)Wt−1,t h u s
the net outﬂow is:
NetOutflowt = Wt − (1 + r
∗)Wt−1 =( g − r
∗)Wt−1 > 0.
The positive outﬂow is highly ineﬃcient for a resource-scarce emerging market econ-
omy.6 It also hints at the presence of a large latent demand for a higher return store
of value instrument among domestic agents.
3 Real Estate Bubbles
Young agents need a store of value to ﬁnance investment opportunities when these
arise. In the basic structure we have outlined, the (saving side of the) economy
is dynamically ineﬃcient and the only store of value is lending international goods
abroad at the safe but low world interest rate of r∗.
The familiar Samuelson (1958) solution to dynamic ineﬃciency is for all genera-
tions to enter a social contract: Rather than lending Wt abroad, the young transfer
their Wt endowment of international goods to the old, and when old, receive the
Wt+1 endowment of the new young, and so on. Each generation, eﬀectively, receives
ar e t u r ng>r ∗ on its international goods endowment.7 However, in an OLG model
there is no mechanism for the old and young to write such contracts. Thus, in the
context of emerging markets that concerns us here, the OLG assumption captures the
dimension of ﬁnancial underdevelopment that limits contracts beyond a small groups
of contemporaneous market participants.
We suppose that in this context an unproductive and irreproducible asset (“real
estate,” for short) is traded domestically. Since the asset is unproductive, any positive
price must be a pure bubble. We denote this price by Bt.
A positive price on the bubble asset is necessarily fragile, as the asset retains value
only if current generations expect that future generations will demand the asset. We
5This is the analog to the corporate-cash-ﬂow empirical concept of dynamic ineﬃciency proposed
by Abel et al (1989) for the context of closed economies.
6It is only matter of relabeling to translate these excessive outﬂows into depressed inﬂows.
7And the ﬁrst generation receives an additional return.
9capture this fragilityby assuming that as of timet, with probabilityλ the coordination
across generation ends, and the young of t+1 choose to save their international goods
abroad instead of purchasing the bubble asset. In this case, the bubble crashes to a
value of zero.
If the bubble does not crash, it grows at the rate rb.W ef o c u so nt h ec a s ew h e r e
the interest rate is at the highest possible level consistent with rational expectations
(this is the only case where the bubble does not vanish asymptotically in the absence
of a crash), so that:
r
b = g.
Thus the expected return from investing in the bubble is







=1+ rb =( 1− λ)(1 + g) < 1+g.
If λ is not too high and the spread ∆rb ≡ (g − r∗) is suﬃciently large, agents
invest some of their international goods in the bubble. This will hold true as long as:
 rb − r
∗ =( 1− λ)∆r
b − λ(1 + r
∗) > 0. (1)
Recall that the young at date t a r ee n d o w e dw i t h( Wt,RK t). They divide Wt into
holdings of the bubble asset and saving in the international market. We denote the
share of bubble assets in the portfolio by αt, and now write the international goods
held by generation-t at date t +1a s :
W
 
t = Wt (1 + r
∗ + αt(˜ r − r
∗))
where ˜ r is either g (no crash) or −1( c r a s h ) .
At date t + 1, an entrepreneur with an investment opportunity enters into two
transactions. First, he sells his bubble asset to the next generation to receive the










10As long as ˜ pt+1 <R , it pays for the entrepreneur to borrow as much as possible.








A banker at date t+1 collects international goods by selling his real estate assets
to the next generation and then lends these goods, along with any savings from date t





Rolling back to date t agents are equally likely to ﬁnd themselves as entrepreneurs
or bankers at date t + 1. Thus the decision problem is to choose a portfolio of the
























t+1) − λ(R + p
C
t+1)=0 ( 3 )
where pB
t+1 and pC
t+1 represent the equilibrium price of loans when the bubble survives
and crashes, respectively.
In words, the young agent gets an excess return of ∆rb if the bubble does not
crash, which happens with probability 1−λ. He trades this oﬀ against the loss (−1)
if the bubble does crash. When old, the agent is either an entrepreneur, in which case
the returns from the bubble funds investment that yields R; or, the agent is a banker,
in which case the returns from the bubble are used to lend to the entrepreneur at the
price ˜ pt+1. Thus returns on the bubble are valued by the agent at R +˜ pt+1.
The supply of funds from bankers is at most W
 
t, while the demand for funds from
entrepreneurs is at most
ψR











Note that, as in the previous section, when ψR < 1 we ﬁnd pB =1 .
For the crash state, market clearing yields:
p
C









11We now consider the equilibrium determination of pC
t and α
p
t (where the super-
script p stands for private). First note that agents’ decision problems are the same
across each period that the bubble does not crash. Thus, without loss of generality,
we drop time subscripts.
Denote αp(pC) as the solution to the agents decision problem, (2), given pC.D e -
note pC(α) as the solution to the market clearing condition, (4), given choices of α.
We are looking for a ﬁxed point (αp,p C) that solve both (2) and (4).
We begin the characterization by considering αp(pC). Given the linearity of the
program, the solution is a step function. Note that if pC = 1, then the derivative of
the objective with respect to α is:
(1 − λ)
∆rb
1+r∗(R +1 )− λ(R +1 )> 0
where the last inequality follows by condition (1). In words, if pC = 1, the bubble
asset dominates saving in the international bank account, so that α =1 . W em a k e
an adjoining assumption by considering the case where pC = R (the highest value
possible). At this price, the derivative of the objective is:
(1 − λ)
∆rb
1+r∗(R +1 )− λ2R.
We assume that
(1 − λ)∆r




< 0( 5 )




∆rb+1+r∗. Under condition (5), if pC = R, saving in the international bank account
dominates saving in the bubble asset.
Conditions (1) and (5) guarantee an interior solution to our problem. The solution
is illustrated in Figure 1. The solid line depicts αp(pC), the step function solution
to the agents decision problem. Note that under conditions (1) and (5) there exists
a unique value of pC that lies strictly between zero and one, whereby the ﬁrst order
condition is satisﬁed with equality. The s-shaped dashed curve in the ﬁgure is the
solution to the market clearing condition, pC(α). The unique equilibrium is at point
αp.
In summary, under (1) and (5), in each period that the bubble does not crash,
agents hold a fraction 0 <α p < 1 of their portfolio in the bubble asset. If the bubble
crashes, the banker’s (gross) return in the loans market is 1 <p C <R , while if the
bubble does not crash, its return is pB = 1. The banker’s return of ˜ p is the central
ingredient in the welfare statements we make next.







Notes: The ﬁgure illustrates the equilibrium determination in the crash state. The solution to
the decision problem for agents traces out the solid-line step function. If agents expect higher
returns on lending international liquidity in the crash-state, they cutback on purchase of bubbles,
and increase their holdings of international liquidity. The s-shaped dashed curve traces out the
market clearing condition as a result of these choices. If all agents hold more of the bubble asset,
then in equilibrium there will be less international liquidity if the bubble crashes and PC will be
higher. αp denotes the equilibrium.
4 Excess Volatility
If λ = 0, and the bubble is not fragile, then its existence is unambiguously beneﬁcial
(Samuelson 1958).
4.1 Crash and Credit Crunch
However, it seems extreme to assume that a coordination-dependent ﬁnancial instru-
ment will always be stable. When λ>0, the economy trades higher capital inﬂows
(or lower net outﬂows) while the bubble is in place, for the possibility of a sudden
reversal in capital ﬂows and the consequent crash in the domestic real estate market.
13Consider the expression for total output at date t:











If there is no crash, then W
 













(R − 1)ψRKt + RKt.
Starting from this level, if we consider the eﬀect at date t+1 of a fall in W
 
t,t h e r e
are two eﬀects that arise.
First, the direct eﬀect is that the investing entrepreneur’s wealth falls, curtailing
his date t investment and reducing output. In the case of the crash, wealth falls to
(1 − αt)Wt(1 + r∗).
Second, the banker has less funds to lend to the investing entrepreneur at date
t + 1. As real estate falls in value, banks are unable to collect as much international
goods from the next generation, and so they cut back on loan supply. If the fall in
the supply of funds is suﬃciently large, the result is a domestic “credit-crunch”: loan
interest rates rise causing investment and output to fall. This credit crunch occurs
at the point at which entrepreneurial investment is constrained by the quantity of
international goods of the current generation of bankers and entrepreneurs. At this
point, since the supply of loanable international goods is limited, banks’ loan interest
rates rise above one.
At date t, agents choose αt and this leads to variation in W
 
t. We deﬁne a “small
crash” as a circumstance where αt is small, so that the bubble crash leads to a small
enough fall in W
 









(R − 1)ψRKt + RKt.
However, if αt is suﬃciently large then the contraction in loan supply leads to a rise
in ˜ pt+1 above one, resulting in the domestic credit crunch. We refer to this event as a
“large crash.” From Figure 1, we see that the threshold between the small and large
crash case is where αt = αS.
In the large crash, pc
t+1 rises above one to
ψR
(1+r∗)(1−αt). We can substitute and ﬁnd
that,8
U
C,L = RWt(1 − αt)(1 + r
∗)+RKt.














14This last expression is intuitive. In the large crash, all of the international goods of
the bankers and entrepreneurs are being invested at date t+1. Each of these invested
goods produces a gross return of R, which in addition to the endowment of RKt,
yields the expression for UC,L.
Finally, the crash in the bubble asset leads to a permanent loss of domestic stores
of value. The next generations invest all of their endowment abroad causing capital
outﬂows.9
4.2 Overexposure to Large Crashes
Although bubbles lead to the possibility of crashes, they do provide the beneﬁt of
increasing growth while they last. The next question we address is whether agents in
the economy make this risk/return trade-oﬀ optimally from society’s point of view.
We show that the private sector’s choices lead to overexposure to large crashes.
Consider the choice of αt that maximizes expected aggregate output (which is





C,L +( 1− λ)U
B (6)
The derivative of this function with respect to αt is:
(1 − λ)(R +1 )
∆rb
1+r∗ − 2λR.
But at the optimum for private agents, the ﬁrst order condition for the large crash
case from (3) is:
(1 − λ)(R +1 )
∆rb




t+1 = R it is evident that these two ﬁrst order conditions coincide, and the
private sector’s choice is constrained eﬃcient. However, if pC
t+1 <R , then the social
planner’s solution to the program in (6) yields an αt that is strictly smaller than αp.10
The distortion in the agents’ decision can be most easily understood by considering
the banker’s portfolio decision. At date t + 1, the value of international goods in
9An example of this phenomena in practice may be the behavior of EM’s following the EM crises
of the late 1990s. These economies turned around from being signiﬁcant net borrowers before the
crises, to become substantial net lenders to the developed world, and the US in particular.
10It is clear that the ﬁrst order conditions diﬀer between the private and planner programs when
pC
t+1 <R . We can assert that αt is strictly smaller than αp because conditions (1) and (5) guarantee
that αp is at an interior, so that at least one of the ﬁrst order conditions is valid.
15the crash-state to the banker is proportional to pC
t+1. However, the social value of
international goods in the crash-state is proportional to R, since these goods are
always used by entrepreneurs to undertake investment projects.11 To the extent
that pC
t+1 <R , the banker has less of an incentive to ensure that he has suﬃcient
international goods to lend to entrepreneurs in the crash-state. Moreover, recall that
p
C
t+1 =m i n

ψR




so that less domestic ﬁnancial development, captured by smaller values of ψ,l o w e r s
pC
t+1 and increases this distortion.
Ex-ante, the low return on lending to entrepreneurs translates into a lack of pru-
dence in the date t portfolio decisions. Bankers chase higher returns by investing
excessively in the risky real estate bubble, rather than retaining some international
liquidity to be in a position to lend to the entrepreneurial sector. Lack of ﬁnancial
development, in the dimension of tighter domestic collateral constraints, overexpose
the economy to the risky bubble.
4.3 Welfare Maximizing Choice
We conclude this section by deriving the welfare maximizing portfolio share.




C +( 1− λ)U
B. (7)
There are two cases to consider in deriving the solution. If α ≤ αS,f r o mF i g u r e1w e
note that pC = 1 and the economy avoids the credit crunch. In this case, UC = UC,S.
If α>α S, pC > 1 and the economy enters the credit crunch if the bubble crashes.
Thus, UC = UC,L.
We note that under (5), the ﬁrst order condition that maximizes (7) when UC =
UC,L, indicates choosing the lowest possible value of α. On the other hand, it follows
from (1) that in the range where UC = UC,S, the ﬁrst order condition indicates
choosing the highest possible value of α. Thus, the welfare maximizing α must lie at
the boundary where α is equal to αS.
In words, a social planner chooses an α that is as large as possible so as to avoid
the credit crunch situation. This choice maximizes the intergenerational transfers
11When pC
t+1 = 1, some international goods stored by the bankers/entrepreneurs go unused by the
entrepreneur. For this reason, the undervaluation argument only applies in the case of large crashes.
16aﬀorded by the bubble, while avoiding the credit crunch where international goods
are scarce. We also note that the stark result of avoiding the credit crunch completely
is due to the linearity of our model, and conditions (1) and (5).12 On the other hand,
the model does highlight the novel aspect of our welfare analysis of bubbles.
5 Aggregate Risk Management Policies
We now focus on the case where the rational real estate bubbles are welfare reducing
and consider a variety of corrective government policies that implement αp = αS.
In practice, a bubble crash in a developed economy leads the central bank to inject
liquidity into the banking sector to oﬀset the credit crunch. While such a policy
may be helpful in our model, in practice it us unlikely to be readily available to
governments in EM’s.13 In a bubble crash, the credibility and liquidity of the central
bank are likely to be low, so that the central bank is in the same position as the
banking sector. Thus, we focus in this section on ex-ante policies that aim to reduce
the exposure to bubble risk.
5.1 Liquidity Requirement
One solution to the risk problem we have raised is for all agents of generation t to
enter into a contract requiring that each agent hold a fraction (1−αS)o ft h e i rw e a l t h
in foreign reserves.
The most natural interpretation of such a social contract is in terms of liquidity
requirements on the banking system. Such requirements are common in many emerg-
ing markets. For example, during the period of Argentina’s currency board banks
were required to hold signiﬁcant dollar-reserves.
But such a solution requires some policing and enforcement. Consider the incen-
tive for one agent to deviate from holding 1 − αS when all other agents are holding
1 − αS. From Figure 1, we see that pC =1a tαS (i.e. at αS, even if the bubble
bursts, the credit crunch is avoided). But, from the same ﬁgure, the solution to the
agent’s decision problem at pC =1i sα = 1. An agent will prefer to invest only in
12For example, when λ goes toward zero, intuition suggests that the optimal α will rise. However,
(5) is violated in this case.
13See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005) for a model of (ex-post) extreme events interventions
in economies with developed (complete) ﬁnancial markets.
17the bubble asset.14
We can also see this by considering the program in (2). The utility gain for an
agent to choose α =1v e r s u sα = αS,w h e npC =1i s ,
Wt(1 − α
S)(ˆ rB − r
∗) > 0,
where the last inequality follows from (1).
Intuitively, if all agents are holding suﬃcient international liquidity, a crash avoids
the credit crunch. Thus, a deviating agent values the bubble asset purely for the ex-
pected return it oﬀers and does not assign any additional cost to the bubble crashing.
This leads the agent to invest all of his wealth in the bubble asset.
If portfolio decisions are costly to observe, a liquidity requirement will be costly
to impose. If the costs are high enough, the economy will revert to the equilibrium
we have described earlier where α = αp.
5.2 Capital Inﬂow Sterilization
An alternative policy to implement the optimal investment in the bubble is capital
inﬂow sterilization. As we show next, this sort of policy avoids the policing issues of
the liquidity requirement, but instead requires that the government having credible
powers of taxation.
Central banks often respond to capital inﬂows by sterilizing. They sell government
debt proportionate to the quantity of the capital inﬂow. The practice is conventionally
seen as an attempt to reduce the monetary expansion created by the capital inﬂow, but
note that, as we show next, it has power even in the abscence of a monetary friction.
If the sterilization is large enough to provide the private sector with alternative non-
bubble assets, it has the potential of reducing investment in real estate bubbles.
Government debt crowds out the bubble, raising interest rates in the process.
Suppose that the government issues one-period debt with face value of Gt at date
t at interest rate rG
t . In addition, it raises taxes at the rate of τs on the international
goods endowment of generation t. The revenue from the debt sale and the tax are
invested at the international interest rate of r∗. Finally, the debt is repaid at date
14Jacklin (1987) makes a related point in the context of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model.
He argues that the Diamond-Dybvig bank is not coalition incentive-compatible if agents can make
side-trades.








∗) − Gt =0 . (8)
Agents purchase αG,t of these bonds with their international endowment (“a cap-
ital inﬂow”) at interest rate rG
t . Then, the wealth equation for generation t becomes,
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where ˜ r is either g (no crash) or −1 (crash), and,
ˆ Wt = Wt(1 − τs).


















We note that government bonds provide the same stable cash-ﬂows as investing
the international endowment abroad. Thus, as long as αG,t + αt < 1, government
bonds and international liquidity are perfect substitutes and rG
t must be equal to
r∗. From the government’s budget constraint, in this case τs =0 . A n ys a l e so f
government debt are accommodated by a reduction in the international liquidity of
the private sector, and the sterilization has no eﬀect.
For the sterilizationto haveany eﬀect, it must be suﬃcientlylarge. Again denoting
by αp the portfolio share that the private sector’s optimally chooses to invest in the
bubble, the sterilization has any eﬀect only if,
Gt >G
∗
t ≡ (1 − α
p)Wt(1 + r
∗).
Let us consider such “large” sterilizations. For these cases, the private sector reduces












The private agents’ ﬁrst order condition, at an interior solution for αt,i sn o w :
(1 − λ)(g − r
G
t )(R + p
B





At the welfare maximizing solution we know that pB = pC = 1. Rewriting, and
solving for rG
t ,w eo b t a i n
r
G
t =( 1− λ)g − λ =ˆ r
b.
19If the government sells debt that raises (1 − αS)Wt resources at date t, agents
purchase both this debt as well as the welfare-maximizing amount of the bubble
asset. Since any investment in the government debt reduces investment in the bubble
asset one-for-one, the interest rate on the debt has to rise to ˆ rb, the expected return
on the bubble.
However, in implementingthe optimal portfolio share, the government has to raise
some taxes. Using the government’s budget constraint, (8), we can solve to ﬁnd that,
τs =( 1− α
S)
ˆ rb − r∗
1+r∗ .
A higher return on the bubble or a lower international interest rate, raise the required
taxes.
The need to collect taxes to support the sterilization raises a concern. If the
government is limited in its ability to raise taxes, then it can only implement small
sterilizations (or sterilizes with bonds that have a low eﬀective return, in the eyes
of the public). But, small sterilizations have no eﬀects. Thus, eﬀective sterilization
requires a government with suﬃciently large tax powers.
6 Public Debt Market Development
Sterilization has the potential to solve the ineﬃciency stemming from agent’s under-
valuation of the systemic risk generated by bubbles. However, the optimal solution
is not to eliminate bubbles altogether, but to reduce their amount to αS in Figure
1. The bubble is the endogenous market solution to the dynamic ineﬃciency created
by domestic ﬁnancial underdevelopment. Sterilization, as we describe it, is merely an
instrument to reduce the fragility created by this market solution. It is not a sub-
stitute for the missing “intergenerational” contract. Can we ﬁnd mechanisms that
both reduce fragility and alleviate dynamic ineﬃciency? We turn to answering this
question next.
The reason our sterilization policy does not solve the dynamic ineﬃciencyproblem
is that the interest rate spread of ˆ rG − r∗ is ﬁnanced with taxes on the same genera-
tion. Thus, on net, there is no intergenerational transfer associated with sterilization.
This is in sharp contrast to Diamond’s (1965) perpetually rolled-over public debt,
which does represent a solution to the dynamic ineﬃciency problem. However, Dia-
mond’s public debt is a bubble in itself and hence raises the same fragility concerns
20surrounding the real estate bubble. If the next generation does not roll-over the debt,
the bubble crashes.
We next show that public debt that is supported by future rather than current
taxes achieves a compromise: Such debt implements intergenerational transfers (like
Diamond), as well as reduces fragility risk (like our sterilization policy). Of course,
pledging future taxes requires credibility and commitment. We thereby establish a
natural connection between a government’s credibility and ability to raise taxes and
the extent to which the government can solve the economy’s dynamic ineﬃciency
problems, while limiting the fragility costs of the bubble.
Suppose the tax base of the government is τWt. However, because of credibility
concerns the market discounts the future tax revenues at the rate (1 − ρ) such that
the pledgeable tax revenues are:
(1 − ρ)
sτWt+s s ≥ 0.
We assume that at t the government issues the maximum debt it can, collateralized by
these future (potential) taxes. With such a debt structure, a high ρ can be interpreted
as very short-term maturity structure of debt, while a low ρ corresponds to a long-
term maturity structure of debt. Let the value of the stock of outstanding government
debt be denoted by Dt. The value satisﬁes,
Dt
Wt










Assume, momentarily, that the stock of government debt, Dt, is suﬃcient to satisfy all
of agents’ store of value demand, that agents use this as the only saving instrument,
and that the government maintains the practice of issuing the maximum collateralized
debt at each point intime. Then, D/W is equal to one at all dates and the interest rate
is constant.15 Let rD denote this equilibrium interest rate, which from (9) satisﬁes:
rD − g
1+g
= τ(1 − ρ)(1 + r
D) − ρ.
It is apparent from this expression that if the government has enough credibility so
that ρ is small relative to τ, then the dynamic ineﬃciency can be completely removed
15D/W is always equal to one, while the tax base is equal to τWt. There is no contradiction
between these statements because, in equilibrium, the taxes are not levied; they simply serve as
collateral for the debt. If all of the taxes of τWt were levied, then ratio of debt to endowments
would shrink toward zero over time.
21as the rD that solves the above equation exceeds g.16 To implement this constrained
eﬃcient equilibrium, the government issues enough public debt to bring rD exactly
to g.
While the pledgability of future taxes is critical, the government actually never
needs to collect taxes to pay for this debt, as it can fully ﬁnance the expiring debt
with new debt. That is, the collateralized debt behaves as Diamond’s debt, but is
not bubbly since it is fully collateralized by taxes.
To see the role of collateralization, consider one of the bonds in the stock of
outstanding government debt at time t. Suppose this bond matures at date T>t
and is collateralized by (1 − ρ)τWT revenues. Then, at date T − 1, the young agent
of generation T −1 will buy up to (1−ρ)τWT face value of this bond, since he knows
that regardless of the behavior of the young agent of generation T, the bond will be
fully repaid. Anticipating this behavior by generation T −1, the young at generation
T − 2 also buy the bond, and so on. Since every bond in the stock of government
debt is collateralized by a speciﬁc, dated, tax revenue, the argument applies to the
entire stock of government debt.
The same argument does not apply to Diamond’s debt solution, or the real estate
bubble. In these cases, the young of generation T − 1 buys the bubble only because
they believe that the young of generation T will do likewise. Of course, such a
coordination dependent asset is fragile.
Collateralized public debt also dominates the real estate bubble as a savings vehicle
since:
r
D −  r
b = r
D − g + λ(1 + g) >r
D − g>0.
The collateralized debt eliminates the bubble, and its fragility.
Note that in the limit case where the government is fully credible, so that ρ =0 ,
then even an inﬁnitesimal tax base is enough to implement the ﬁrst best with stable
public debt.17 In the more realistic case of a government with limited credibility, the
government may be unable to generate enough reliable store of value instruments to
16F o rs m a l l e rv a l u e so fτ relative to ρ for which the government cannot issue debt such that
D/W equals one, there is still room for improvement on the market bubble outcome. For example,
if parameters allow for a D/W =1− αS < 1, then the government can opt for the sterilization
solution. But, in contrast to the solution in the previous section, the sterilization leverages future
taxes and not current taxes.
17This limit result is akin to the point made in McCallum (1987) and extended in Caballero and
Ventura (2002), that well deﬁned property rights even over an inﬁnitesimal share of an economy’s
growing output, can eliminate the possibility of bubbles.
22fully crowd out the bubble. When ρ = 1, the the government can only sterilize but is
unable to implement intergenerational redistributions without incurring risks similar
to those of the market bubble.
7F i n a l R e m a r k s
One view of emerging markets crises describes normal timesas periods with signiﬁcant
capital inﬂows, which are suddenly interrupted by liquidity crises.18
This paper highlights a diﬀerent view. Normal times are those with net capital
outﬂows. These normal periods are occasionally interrupted by speculative bubbles,
which can crash. Moreover, we show that in many instances these bubbles, while
rational, are socially ineﬃcient since they introduce excessive aggregate fragility.
Both views stem from some form of ﬁnancial underdevelopment. However, the
bubble-view reﬂects a more primitive domestic ﬁnancial market, where residents ﬁnd
limited trust-worthy local assets.
Ingredients of both views probably coexist and vary in relative importance across
economies and times. During the mid 1990s, for example, South East Asia received
large amounts of capital inﬂows, which ﬁnanced both productive investments and fed
Real Estate bubbles. In this context, the series of crises that started with Thailand
and soon spread to the rest of the region, had elements of both a liquidity crisis
and a crash in local bubbles. Over time, the liquidity crunch disappeared, but the
bubble-assets were not recreated. The latter phenomenon has played out in much
of the Emerging Market world as well as in some newly industrialized economies.
¿From the point of view of our analysis, the disappearance of the bubble assets is an
important factor behind the acceleration of the capital inﬂows to the US — and hence
the worsening of the US current account deﬁcit– since the Asian/Russian crises. Along
the same lines, despite the attention that China’s dollar-reserves accumulation and
its potential reversal has received, the real danger may lie elsewhere. Today, Chinese
savers are forbidden from accessing US instruments directly. A normalization of
capital controls may lead to a crash in their buoyant real estate market and increased
capital outﬂows toward the US.
It goes without saying that ours is a highly stylized characterization of emerging
market dynamics. For practical purposes, we do not mean to highlight the multiple
18E.g., Furman and Stiglitz (1998), Calvo (1998), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Chang
and Velasco (2001).
23equilibria nature of bubbles, or even the extreme form of rationality we have required
on agents. They simply capture the high volatility in emerging markets and the role
of speculation and expectations. Moreover, although the bursting of bubbles is exoge-
nous in our model, one could extend it and link the bubble bursting to fundamentals;
for instance, any domestic or external factor that raises the relative appeal of for-
eign assets, could crash the bubble in our model. Bubbles for us represent highly
volatile domestic ﬁnancial assets which are not backed by solid fundamentals, sound
government policy, and institutions. They have the potential to yield high returns if
domestic markets, rich in funds but poor on quality assets, choose to speculate on
them, but they are also susceptible to large drops if fundamentals turn sour.
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